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Abstract 
Three experiments examine whether simple pair-wise comparison judgments, involving 
the “recognition heuristic” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), are sensitive to implicit 
cues to the nature of the comparison required. Experiments 1 & 2 show that participants 
frequently choose the recognized option of a pair if asked to make “larger” judgments 
but are significantly less likely to choose the unrecognized option when asked to make 
“smaller” judgments. Experiment 3 demonstrates that, overall, participants consider 
recognition to be a more reliable guide to judgments of a magnitude criterion than lack 
of recognition and that this intuition drives the framing effect. These results support the 
idea that, when making pair-wise comparison judgments, inferring that the recognized 
item is large is simpler than inferring that the unrecognized item is small. 
 
125 words 
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The recognition heuristic, one of a number of suggested “fast and frugal” 
heuristics, provides the following rule-of-thumb for inferences with respect to an 
unknown criterion: “If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer 
that the recognized object has the higher value with respect to the criterion” (Goldstein 
& Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 76). So, for example, if a participant is asked to judge which of 
two cities has the larger population, and they recognize only one of the cities, following 
the recognition heuristic leads them to choose the recognized city. Recognition works as 
a strategy in cases where the probability of recognition is influenced by a mediator 
variable which itself reflects the “real” but inaccessible criterion (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 2002). For example, the mediating variable for many such choices might be 
the number of times something (i.e., a city) has appeared in newspaper reports. Larger 
cities are more likely to be encountered (e.g., mentioned in newspaper reports) and 
hence more likely to be recognized. In this example, recognition therefore provides a 
cue to size. 
The recognition heuristic has been widely investigated in magnitude inference 
and performance prediction tasks, particularly in sporting domains (Bennis & Pachur, 
2006; Pachur & Biele, 2007; Serwe & Frings, 2006) where the requirement to assess the 
biggest, the fastest, or the most promising is self-evident. For the sake of simplicity, we 
will talk in terms of “magnitude judgments” but note that the recognition heuristic is 
much more generally applicable, being a tool for making inferences about some 
unknown criterion. Where this criterion is susceptible (at least in principle) to 
quantification, these inferences can be spoken of in terms of judgments of “magnitude” 
across that criterion. 
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In the cities task, and in many other tasks in which the recognition heuristic has 
been tested, the question asks for the larger, or more highly-valued, item along the 
criterion or magnitude in question. Under these circumstances, a possible 
implementation of the recognition heuristic inference rule could be of the form: Large 
(X) if Recognized (X). Thus, when asked “which is larger?” a response of X is 
compatible with the information given in the question (i.e., that “largeness” is 
important). An alternative articulation of the rule, however, is that the inference is 
drawn across the pair. Formally, Larger (X,Y) if Recognized (X) and ¬Recognized (Y) 
and it is this implication which seems to have been intended by Goldstein and 
Gigerenzer (2002). The two variants are equally responsive to the structure of the 
environment in that, if the direction of the correlation between recognition and criterion 
is evaluated (as suggested by Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 76), they can be reversed 
equally easily, and the unrecognized option selected if this correlation is negative. 
Substituting Small for Large in the above inference rules, for example, produces the 
following inference rules: Small (X) if Recognized (X) and Smaller (X,Y) if Recognized 
(X) and ¬Recognized (Y). Either rule would account for the apparent “reversal” of the 
recognition heuristic when the criterion-recognition correlation is negative, as reported 
by Oppenheimer (2003). Nevertheless, these contrasting implementations of the 
heuristic raise the possibility that a framing effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) may 
occur in recognition-based choices if the question, rather than the criterion-recognition 
correlation, is shifted. 
Framing effects are common across a wide range of decision making tasks (e.g., 
Kuhberger, 1995, 1998). They occur where choices alter based on how the options are 
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described even though the information given in the descriptions is logically equivalent 
(Johnson-Laird & Shafir, 1993). The 2-AFC cities task can be placed within this 
context. Least (which is smallest?) and greatest (which is biggest?) framings of the 
judgment are logically equivalent for a 2-AFC task, since X>Y necessarily entails that 
Y<X. However, two logically equivalent statements (A and B) about a choice problem 
are only informationally equivalent if there is no choice relevant background condition, 
which a listener can infer from the speaker‟s choice to present either A or B to the 
listener (Sher & Mackenzie, 2006). Otherwise, the listener infers that the speaker‟s 
decision to use either A or B as a means of presenting information reveals something 
about the speaker‟s interests and requirements (Grice, 1975). 
 Could this analysis apply to recognition-driven inference, and what would the 
consequences for adaptive heuristics be? Specifically, if the question is altered from 
“which of two objects has the highest value (which is largest)” to “which object has the 
lowest value (which is smallest)” an inference made across the pair of items provides 
direct information about the unrecognized item (Larger (X,Y)). The two queries are then 
equivalent and the unrecognized item should be chosen. If, however, the inference 
typically drawn is Large (X) if Recognized (X) that is, if the individual chooses to focus 
primarily or only upon the recognized item, then the two queries are not directly 
equivalent. Arguably, further work is necessary to establish Small (Y) if ¬Recognized 
(Y) and choice of the unrecognized item may be much less common. 
 The classical statement of the recognition heuristic (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 
2002, p. 76) assumes that comparison tasks are solved by inferring the relationship 
between the two items. In this case the logical equivalence of 2-AFC lesser and greater 
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judgments should be transparent and there should be a reversal in choices when a least 
question is substituted for a greatest question. There should be invariance in the usage 
of the heuristic and hence no framing effect. Conversely, if the judgments are based 
upon an inference about the recognized item only, then more choices of the recognized 
item with the greater question should be made than choices of the unrecognized item 
with the lesser question. Note that, in a classic “framing” manipulation, choice shifts 
between two options based on the presentation of those options. We do not expect 
participants to abandon recognition entirely as a cue, rather, given a different question 
framing, we wish to determine whether heuristic usage – defined here as using 
recognition as a cue according to the pair-wise inference rule Larger (X,Y) if Recognized 
(X) and ¬Recognized (Y) – declines despite the logical equivalence of the query. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
Method. 
Participants. 92 volunteers (54 men, 38 women) participated. Average age was 25 years 
(range 17-62). The participants were divided into two groups: a “larger” (n = 50) and a 
“smaller” framing group (n = 42). 
Materials and Design. The materials used in this experiment were based on those used 
by Oppenheimer (2003). The names of 10 English towns were paired with the names of 
10 fictional towns (see Appendix A). The English towns were selected from a list of 
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towns with football teams in the Championship
1
, and each was paired with three 
different fictional towns, giving 30 test pairs. English towns or cities whose soccer 
teams played in the Championship
2
, were chosen as their names would thus be familiar 
to the participants without being considered a large or major city. Large cities in the UK 
(e.g., Liverpool, Manchester) tend to have soccer teams in the Premier League rather 
than the Championship
3
. In addition, two groups of filler items were created. The first 
group consisted of 10 pairs of real towns and cities taken from a list of 8 (four 
international towns/cities, e.g., Limerick, and four English towns, e.g., Bradford). The 
second type of filler item consisted of pairs of the fictional towns. Participants each 
received 9 pairs of this type
4
. Each participant received 49 choice pairs in total, of which 
30 were of the critical recognition heuristic type. The order of presentation of these pairs 
was randomized across participants. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with a four-page experimental booklet. They 
were told that they would be presented with pairs of names of towns. The “larger” 
framing group was told that their task was to circle the town with the largest population 
in each pair. The “smaller” group was asked to circle the town with the smallest 
population. Participants were given one minute to complete the task
5
. In order to 
encourage them to work quickly, participants were given time updates at 15-second 
intervals. On completion of the first part of the task participants were given a list of all 
                                                          
1 As current in the 2003-4 season. 
2 Formerly known as the First Division, the Championship is the second tier soccer league. 
3 Large cities often have more than one soccer team so towns with teams in both the Championship and the 
Premier League (e.g., Birmingham) were also excluded. 
4 There should have been 10 pairs of this type but, due to a printing error, participants only received 9 pairs. 
5 It seems reasonable to assume that participants will be more inclined to employ fast and frugal heuristics where the 
situation requires them to be fast or frugal, hence we employed a degree of time pressure for people‟s judgments. 
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of the towns used in the experiment (both real and fictional) and asked to circle those 
they recognized prior to the experiment. 
 
Results. 
Some participants did not complete all 49 choices in the allotted time and some either 
failed to recognize a real town name, or erroneously recognized a fictional town name. 
Therefore, we calculated for each participant: (a) the number of times they could have 
used the recognition heuristic (i.e., where one item in a pair is recognized and the other 
is not), (b) the number of times they did use the recognition heuristic. The second figure 
divided by the first gives the proportion of responses consonant with the recognition 
heuristic. Figure 1 shows the proportionate use of decision-processes consistent with the 
recognition heuristic for each individual in the greater framing (upper panel) and the 
lesser framing (lower panel) of the choice task. For the “greater” framing group, this is 
the proportion of responses where the recognized item was chosen. For the “lesser” 
framing group, this is the proportion of responses where the unrecognized item was 
chosen. 
 
FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
 Comparison of the groups shows that the incidence of choices consistent with 
the recognition heuristic was significantly greater in the “larger” (mean proportion 
heuristic usage 62%) than in the “smaller” framing (mean proportion 53 %), t = 3.31, df 
= 90, p < 0.001 (1-tailed). For the larger framing group, a one sample t-test further 
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showed that, by participant, the proportion of responses consistent with the recognition 
heuristic was significantly greater than would be expected by chance, t = 3.55, df = 49, p 
= .001
6. In contrast, amongst the “smaller” framing group one sample t-test, by 
participant, failed to show any significant difference from chance, t = 1.0, df = 41, p = 
.34.  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 shows that participants were less likely to base their judgments on 
recognition when asked which of two cities was the smaller than when asked which of 
two cities was the larger. Although they chose the city they recognized more often than 
chance for the “larger” question, they did not choose the unrecognized city more often 
than chance for the “smaller” question, as predicted by choice based on a direct 
inference about the relationship between the two items. Instead, the existence of a 
framing effect in people‟s usage of the recognition heuristic is consistent with an 
inference that is primarily directed at the recognized item (an item-based inference). 
 
Experiment 2. 
 In running Experiment 1 we observed that, on debrief, participants sometimes 
claimed that they had used the foreign sounding names of the cities as a cue. For 
example, Rhavadran and Heingjing were reported as sounding Indian and Chinese 
respectively, both (from a UK perspective) large, and heavily-populated regions located 
                                                          
6 In this and all subsequent analyses, the p-values reported for all t-tests are 2-tailed unless stated otherwise. 
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on a different continent. It was therefore reasonable for UK participants to suppose that 
these unfamiliar cities were relatively large but unknown to them by virtue of distance. 
Reasoning of this kind may have affected choice decisions when these items were 
involved. It is unlikely to affect the appearance of the framing effect since both groups 
were presented with the same stimuli but, to be sure, we re-ran Experiment 1 using a 
different domain, a different set of stimuli and a different judgment task. In addition to 
moving away from any potential problems with the “Cities” materials, moving to 
studying recognition within a new domain helps to establish the generality of any 
findings. We chose judgments of the relative wealth of individuals as our new domain. 
If asked which of two people is the wealthier, it may be reasonable to choose recognized 
(famous) names over unrecognized (unknown) names, i.e., to apply the recognition 
heuristic. Each year, the Sunday Times newspaper in the United Kingdom prints an 
ordered list of the 1000 richest people in the country, alongside several additional lists 
(e.g., 100 richest people under 30 years old). As the wealth of the people on this list 
comes from a wide range of sources (e.g., business, inheritance, entertainment) there is 
scope for wide variation in recognition, not only across the people named, but also 
across participants in any experiment (depending on their areas of interest). This makes 
it a very rich domain in which to study the impact that recognition has on judgments of 
relative wealth. 
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. 80 volunteers (28 men, 32 women) participated. Average 
age was 23 years (range 18-54). They were divided into a “richer” (n = 40) and a 
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“poorer” framing group (n = 40). The procedure was essentially identical to that of 
Experiment 1. Participants were presented with a booklet containing 60 pairs of names 
taken from the Sunday Times Rich List 2005 and were asked to circle who out of each 
pair was the richest (“richer” framing group) or poorest (“poorer” framing group). 
Participants had 90 seconds to complete the task, with updates at 15 second intervals. 
On completion of the choice phase of the task, participants were presented with a list of 
all of the names and indicated those that they recognized prior to taking part in the 
experiment. 
 
Materials and Design. A range of names selected from the Sunday Times Rich List 2005 
were pretested for recognition. Names that were considered to carry intrinsic clues to 
wealth independent of recognition (e.g., “aristocratic-sounding” names) were excluded 
from the sample. On the basis of this pretest 60 pairs of names were constructed. The 
key pairs of names paired a name that elicited mid- to high-level recognition on 
pretesting with a name that pretesting identified as being unrecognized, despite the 
wealth of the individual concerned. The materials (see Appendix B) consisted of 40 
pairs of names of this type, along with 20 pairs of filler items. Of the filler items, 10 
pairs presented a highly recognized name with another highly recognized name, and 10 
pairs presented an unrecognized name with another unrecognized name.  
 
Results. 
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 Heuristic usage was calculated as in Experiment 1. Figure 2 shows stronger 
overall evidence for use of the recognition heuristic in this domain. For both the “richer” 
and the “poorer” frames, choices consistent with use of the recognition were made 
significantly more often than expected by chance t = 15.88, df = 39, p < 0.001 and t = 
12.64, df = 39, p < 0.001, respectively. Comparing the two groups, there was a small 
reduction of heuristic usage in the poorer framing (mean proportion heuristic usage 
84%), t = 1.63, df = 78, p = 0.05 (1-tailed), compared to the richer framing (mean 
proportion 89%), indicating that the question framing once again influenced responding 
although to a lesser extent than previously. 
 
FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
Discussion 
 As in Experiment 1, the results show that people are less likely to employ the 
recognition heuristic when asked a “lesser” question (in this case, who is poorer?) than 
when asked a “greater” question. The framing effect is weaker in the wealth domain 
however. Although there is a clear difference in choice behavior between “greater” and 
“lesser” frames, both produced recognition-based choices at a level greater than chance. 
One reason for this might be that recognition-based choices were close to ceiling in the 
standard (greater) framing for this domain, possibly because – in common parlance – 
“rich” and “famous” are used as virtual synonyms. In the city task, recognizability and 
the size criterion are only indirectly related through a mediating variable such as the 
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number of mentions in a news article. In the wealth task, causal connections can 
potentially be drawn – in either direction – between fame (recognizability) and fortune 
(criterion). 
 
Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 applies a repeated measures design to the same questions as 
Experiments 1 and 2. It is possible that a decision-making „set‟ might be established if 
the same decision (e.g., which of these towns is larger?) is faced repeatedly. Varying the 
decision question within-participants prevents the development of an artificial „set‟ of 
this kind providing reassurance that the use (or failure to use) recognition-based 
inference is not simply the consequence of a mechanized “set effect” or Einstellung 
(Bilalić, McLeod & Gobet, 2008; Luchins & Luchins, 1958; McCloy, Beaman, Morgan 
& Speed, 2007). A repeated-measures design also enables us to examine the reliability 
of any observed individual differences in use of recognition-based inference. The study 
presented participants with post-experiment questions designed to identify their 
intuitions concerning the criterion-recognition relationship by asking them to judge the 
relative likelihood of recognizing items because they are large or not recognizing items 
because they are small. We anticipate that participants who believe they are more likely 
to recognize a town because it is large will show a stronger framing effect than 
participants who consider not recognizing a small town is as likely as recognizing a 
large town. This is because the former group are indicating a preference for inferring 
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only that Large (X) if Recognized (X) whereas the latter group are additionally inferring 
that it is equally likely that Small (Y) if ¬Recognized (Y). 
 
Method 
Participants. 72 participants (13 men, 59 women) with an average age of 23 years 
(range 18-67) volunteered to take part. 
Materials and Design. Participants were presented with the town names from 
Experiment 1 and with a subsection of the names used in Experiment 2. Participants 
received 120 choice pairs, 60 pairs of town names and 60 pairs of names from the Rich 
List. For 30 of the town name pairs they were asked to identify the largest and for the 
other 30 pairs they were asked to identify the smallest town. Likewise, for the Rich List 
names they were asked to identify the richest person for half of the materials and the 
poorest for the other half. Presentation was blocked and counterbalanced. In two 
separate questions, administered subsequent to the choice tests, participants were asked 
to indicate what they thought was more likely a) they will recognize a town/person 
because it is big/they are rich, b) they will not recognize a town/person because it is 
small/they are poor, or c) the two options are equally likely. 
Procedure. Participants were presented with an eight-page booklet. The four different 
types of judgment tasks were each presented on a separate page, the order of which was 
counterbalanced across participants. They were given 60s to complete each task. On 
completion, they were asked the two likelihood questions which were followed by a 
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request to indicate all of the names and towns they recognized prior to taking part in the 
experiment.  
 
Results. 
Choice Behavior. A repeated-measures ANOVA on the proportion of recognition 
heuristic usage with question frame and domain as within-participants factors shows 
main effects of frame, F (1,70) = 4.63, p  = .035, and domain; F (1,70) = 76.21, p < 
.001, and a significant interaction between the two; F (1,70) 7.16, p = .009. Choice 
behavior was strongly consistent with the use of the recognition heuristic in the Rich 
List domain, 85% for the „who is richest question‟ and 86% for the „who is poorest‟ 
question (t = 16.38, df = 71, p < .001, and t = 17.69, df = 70, p < .001 respectively). 
Choice behavior was overall consistent with use of the recognition heuristic in the city 
size domain, 69% for the „which town is largest‟ question and 57% for the „which town 
is smallest‟ question (t = 6.58, df = 71, p < .001, and t = 2.21, df = 71, p = .03 
respectively). Paired samples t-tests confirmed a framing effect in the city size domain 
in that participants made more choices consistent with the recognition heuristic for the 
greater than the smaller frame, t = 3.19, df = 71, p = .002, but no reliable framing effect 
in the Rich List domain, t = -.14, df = 70, p = .89. Figure 3 shows individual choice 
behavior for the city size task, and Figure 4 shows the same data for the wealth task. 
 
FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE 
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FIGURE FOUR ABOUT HERE 
 
Individual Differences in Rated Likelihoods and the Use of Recognition. Many 
participants were willing to rate it equally likely that they would recognize a person 
because they are rich/ a town because it is large and they wouldn‟t recognize a person 
because they are poor/ don‟t recognize a town because it is small (Cities 43%; Rich List 
32% of participants). However, for those who did not consider the two probabilities 
equivalent, many rated it more likely that they would recognize an option due to size 
(43%) or wealth (57%). Few were willing to endorse the claim that they were less likely 
to recognize an item due to its lack of size or wealth (Cities 14%; Rich List 11%). A 
chi-square goodness of fit test revealed that judgments of the probabilities differed 
significantly both for the cities task; χ2 = 12.25, df = 2, p = .002, and for the rich list; χ2 
= 22.75, df = 2, p < .001, with the most popular choice overall being that it was more 
likely that they would recognize an item because it was large and the least popular being 
that it was more likely that they would fail to recognize an item because it was small. 
Participants‟ susceptibility to framing effects was related to their responses to these 
questions. Where we found an overall framing effect, in the Cities task, this was driven 
by those who believed that they were more likely to recognize a town because it was 
large. Broken down into groups, the framing effect – the difference between use of 
recognition in larger and smaller questions - was significant only for this group, t = 
3.34, df =30, p = .002, not for those who thought they were less likely to recognize a 
town because it was small t =1.37, df = 9, p = .2 (although this finding is statistically 
underpowered relative to the first comparison) or for those who thought both 
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possibilities were equally as likely, t = 1.07, df = 30, p = .29. The significant framing 
effect for this first group reflects difference reflects significantly higher use of 
recognition when asked the larger question than would be expected by chance, t = 5.91, 
df = 30, p < .001 and use of recognition not significantly different from chance when 
asked the smaller question, t = 1.71, df = 30, p = .1. 
 
Discussion. 
 Experiment 3 again demonstrates a framing effect for the Cities task, although in 
this experiment use of recognition in the Wealth task was higher (near ceiling) and, 
perhaps in consequence, no framing effect was observed when that task was examined 
in isolation, although the main effect of frame remained significant across the domains. 
Post-hoc questioning revealed that reliably more participants were willing to state that 
recognition because of magnitude was more likely than lack of recognition because of 
lack of magnitude. Overall, more people in Experiment 3 endorsed unequal probabilities 
than were prepared to state that the two situations were equally likely. This pattern was 
identical for city size and wealth judgment tasks and is consistent with the observed 
framing effects and the hypothesis that greater and lesser questions invoke different 
cognitive processes associated with inferences made concerning the single recognized 
item. Importantly, a significant framing effect was only found amongst those 
participants who endorsed the idea that they were more likely to recognize a large item 
than to not recognize a small item. This finding confirms that the association between 
recognition and magnitude (or high value along a criterion) drives individuals to choose 
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the recognized item whereas those same participants, if they do not associate lack of 
recognition with small magnitudes (or low values along a criterion), do not choose the 
unrecognized item significantly more than would be expected by chance if asked to 
indicate which option is the smallest. 
 
General Discussion 
 To summarize, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that question framing can 
alter usage of the recognition heuristic. People are less likely to use the heuristic when 
making judgments of which of two items has the least magnitude (smaller; poorer) than 
when judging which of two items has the greatest magnitude (larger; richer). 
Experiment 3 demonstrated that, overall, participants considered it to be intrinsically 
less plausible that they should fail to recognize an item because it is small than that they 
should recognize an item because of its size. This in itself implies a framing effect in 
recognition-driven judgment. Participants who showed this asymmetry in their rated 
intuitions of the relationship between the criterion and the recognition status of the item 
were the ones for whom a significant framing effect appeared in the Cities task. This 
suggests that recognition-driven choice in paired-choice tasks is based on inferences 
about the recognized item rather than reflecting a direct inference about the relationship 
between the paired items. The framing effect in Experiment 3 was limited to the Cities 
domain, however, and this may have been a consequence of a ceiling effect in the 
Wealth judgment task.  
 The current study shows how – in a similar manner to the original framing effect 
– logically equivalent forms can produce different behaviors (Kahneman & Tversky, 
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1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). A framing effect exists across logically 
equivalent choices, indicating that such choices are often informed by considering 
individual items rather than only making pair-wise comparisons. In recognition-based 
choice, such item-specific information is obviously more readily available for the 
recognized item of the pair. The relatively small framing effect observed in the Wealth 
domain in comparison to that seen in the Cities domain also indicates that domain-
specific information contributes to nominally recognition-based decision-making. This 
“framing effect” differs from the classic framing observation, however, in that it reveals 
a reluctance to employ a particular (recognition-based) choice strategy when given a 
different framing rather than showing a wholesale switch-over in preference between 
two options. Other authors (e.g., Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Volz et al. 2006) have 
concluded that choosing the recognized item is the “default” choice rule and the current 
data are not inconsistent with this. However, if the inference rule for the use of 
recognition is item-based (Large (X) if Recognized (X)) this accounts for the basic data 
on the recognition heuristic and its default status. As a default option, the choice rule is 
well-adapted to the environment if inferences are primarily concerned with identifying 
the highest-valued item along a criterion (e.g., the most promising sportsman, the best-
performing shares) rather than the lowest. Although we have no data on the relative 
frequency with which such decisions are made, it seems intuitively likely that high 
criterion judgments (the greater question) are required more often than low criterion 
judgments (the lesser question).
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Figure Captions. 
Figure 1. Proportion of responses per participant consistent with recognition-based 
inference. The upper panel represents the “larger” framing and the lower panel 
represents the “smaller” framing. Chance performance is .5 in both cases. 
Figure 2. Proportion of responses per participant consistent with recognition-based 
inference. The upper panel represents the “richer” framing and the lower panel 
represents the “poorer” framing. Chance performance is .5 in both cases. 
Figure 3. Proportion of responses per participant consistent with recognition-based 
inference in the city size task. The upper panel represents the “larger” framing and the 
lower panel represents the “smaller” framing. Chance performance is .5 in both cases 
Figure 4 Proportion of responses per participant consistent with recognition-based 
inference in the wealth judgment task. The upper panel represents the “larger” framing 
and the lower panel represents the “smaller” framing. Chance performance is .5 in both 
cases 
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FIGURE ONE 
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FIGURE TWO 
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FIGURE THREE 
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FIGURE FOUR 
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Appendix A 
List of the towns and cities used as materials in the Cities task. 
 
Fictional 
Papayito 
Al Ahbahib 
Las Besas 
Weingshe 
Rio del Sol 
Heingjing 
Rhavadran 
Gohaiza 
Schretzberg 
Svatlanov
Real 
Norwich 
Ipswich 
Preston 
Wigan 
Sunderland 
Crewe 
Coventry 
Gillingham 
Sheffield 
Burnley
Filler 
Limerick 
Toledo 
Berkley 
Haifa 
Stoke 
Rotherham 
Bradford 
Derby 
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Appendix B 
 
Sunday Times Rich List names used in Experiments 2 & 3. Wealth (in millions) as 
estimated in the 2005 Rich list is given in brackets after each name.  
 
Pamela Morgan Bell (110) 
Simon Fuller (75) 
Jackie Collins (66) 
Paul Marshall (100) 
Anne Robinson (50) 
Barbara Taylor Bradford (100) 
Eddie Irvine (153) 
Peter Hambro (75) 
Lennox Lewis (100) 
Eric Clapton (130) 
Robert Adair (172) 
Judy Craymer (67) 
Charlie Watts (80) 
Luke Johnson (80) 
Ronnie Wood (65) 
David Gilmour (75) 
Karen Millen (40) 
Will Champion (10) 
Stephen Beetham (8) 
James Berry (7) 
Chris Martin (10) 
Edward Macfarlane (6) 
Damien Duff (8) 
Nicky Butt (7) 
Daniel Radcliffe (6) 
Craig Pope (5) 
Sophie Dahl (5) 
Mark Shuttleworth (170) 
Bernard Matthews (316) 
Rod Stewart (80) 
Rowan Atkinson (60) 
Brian May (60) 
Michael Lemos (1100) 
Alisa Marks (40) 
Christopher Moran 
(152) 
Douglas Myers (130) 
Dean Allen (138) 
James Dyson (1050) 
Barrie Haigh (183) 
Trevor Baines (130) 
Tom Jones (175) 
Kevin Stanford (80) 
Keith Richards (165) 
John Frieda (180) 
Christopher Hohn (75) 
Carol Ainscow (40) 
Harry Hyams (320) 
Mark Knopfler (65) 
Tom Wheatcroft (65) 
Adrian Kirby (65) 
Kathryn Sanders (5) 
Geoffrey Elliot (60) 
Gareth Gates (5) 
Tony Pidgley (60) 
 
